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ABSTRACT 
INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT IN RURAL NIGER 
AND HIGH COSTS 
LOW PERFORMANCE 
Paper documents nature and magnitude of transaction costs of rural credit 
in Niger. System is limited to input delivery role, lacking essential 
banking practices. Costs of the system are substantial, with largest share 
borne by the institutions involved. The system does not perform a meaningful 
role in resource allocation. 
INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT IN RURAL NIGER LOW PERFORMANCE 
AND HIGH COSTS 
Transaction costs of credit are defined as all non-interest costs associated 
with loan transactions. This paper documents their nature and magnitude in the 
rural credit network of Niger. The first two sections provide a conceptual 
framework for the analysis of these costs, and outline the special features of 
the Nigerien credit system. The other sections of the paper present and discuss 
the roles performed, and the costs incurred by the different participants in the 
system. 
Tramaction Costa and In8titut1onal Perforaance 
The efficiency with which financial markets operate determines the magnitude 
of the contribution of this sector to development. Transaction costs are an 
appropriate measure of the degree of "friction" existing in the functioning of 
these markets. The higher the transaction costs of financial intermediation the 
less efficient the performance of financial markets, and the more constrained 
their contribution to development. 
A "complete" financial system is comprised by surplus units (savers), deficit 
units (investors), and financial intermediaries. The latter play the role of 
mobilizing funds offered by savers and making them available to investors. All 
transaction between these participants in the financial system involve explicit 
prices (interest rates) and non-interest transaction costs. 
Surplus units in the economy (depositors) incur search and information costs 
in selecting a depository institution, and further costs associated with 
performing transactions, i.e., deposits, withdrawals, and transfers of funds. 
Transaction costs incurred by financial intermediaries may be classified into 
costs of mobilizing funds and costs of lending. The former correspond to 
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resources utilized in handling deposit accounts, documentation, record-keeping, 
and issuing statements. Costs of lending refer to costs associated with four 
stages: (a), loan evaluation and analysis; (b), loan disbursement; (c), 
monitoring of the borrower's investments; and (d), loan recovery. All four 
activities involved in lending are necessary to guarantee a good performance of 
the financial intermediary. Loan evaluation and loan recovery may be the two most 
critical stages of this process, but good record-keeping of disbursements and 
loan monitoring are still necessary to obtain satisfactory results. Each one of 
these four steps also represents transaction costs for the borrower. Forms must 
be filled out and documents must be supplied to the lender in the application 
process. Several trips to the bank's office may be necessary during the 
negotiation, disbursemnet, and repayment stages. 
Transaction costs of lending in "conventional" credit systems in less-
developed economies are usually high. Intermediation costs are particularly high 
in development banks operating in the rural areas of these economies 1 . The 
absence of appropriate means of transportation and communication in rural areas 
increases the costs incurred by lenders and borrowers. Financial regulations and 
complicated loan procedures associated with selective credit policies further 
augment the costs borne by financial intermediaries and rural borrowers. However, 
even in the absence of cumbersome loan-targeting schemes, the operation of a 
conventional credit system will imply transaction costs for all participants in 
the loan contract. 
1 Several studies of transaction costs have been undertaken recently in 
Latin-America, the Caribbean, and Asia. Their results suggest that transaction 
costs for institutional lenders are in the order of 8 to 14 percent, i.e., 
several points higher than their usual operating margins. Transaction costs of 
borrowing fluctuate between 2 and 30 percent in different country studies. For 
lenders and borrowers, transaction costs vary widely depending on the complexity 
of the loan procedure. 
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The Rural Credit Syetea of N11'8r 
The major participants in the Nigerien rural credit system are: (a), the 
individual borrowers at the village level; (b), the "groupeaent 11utualistes" 
(GMs) and cooperatives 2; and (c), two institutions, the "Caisse Nationale de 
Credit Agricole" (CNCA), and the "Union Nationale de Cooperatives" (UNC)3. The 
CNCA is indeed the lending institution, whereas the UNC is the institution that 
deals directly with the cooperatives and GMs at the village level. 
The institutional rural financial system of Niger is "incomplete" in two very 
important ways. First, even though rural savings exist, they are not mobilized by 
the institution lending to agriculture. Instead, this institution relies 
exclusively upon government funds and external support. Second, the 
institutional credit network dealing with agriculture does not operate as a 
conventional and well established credit system. Of the four stages of the loan 
procedure referred to above, loan disburseaent is probably the only phase that 
could be considered in place. However, key record-keeping practices associated 
with disbursement are deficient. Evaluation and analysis of loan applications do 
not exist, and there is no systematic loan recovery efforts. In-kind loans are 
allocated aaong cooperatives, among "groupements mutualistes" (GMs), and among 
individual borrowers based on criteria that do not consider creditworthiness. 
This is partially due to the lack of appropriate records in the institutions 
involved, and the lack of sufficiently trained personnel to engage in this 
activity. 
2 The GMs are village-level groups that comprise a cooperative. 
3 The institution dealing with input supply, the "Central 
d'Approvisionnement" (CA), plays an important role in the input delivery process, 
but it is not considered here as a part of the credit network. 
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Three major implications of the under-development of the institutional credit 
system in Niger can be outlined at this point. First, the system does not and 
cannot perform any meaningful resource allocation role through financial 
intermediation. Secondly, the system does not provide the financial intermediary 
with instruments of credit rationing in the presence of regulations, notably the 
fixed interest-rate structure prevailing in Niger. Third, as a loan delivery 
system the credit network of Niger should be a rather low cost operation. 
Existing procedures are simple and institutional resources are scarce, therefore 
the transaction costs associated with the system are expected to be low. However, 
as will be made clear in this paper, this should not be interpreted as an 
indicator of efficiency. Rather, these costs will be measuring the resource costs 
involved in operating an input delivery system, without the key components and 
functions of a complete credit system. 
The assessment of the transaction costs associated with the system is 
undertaken at three levels: first, the individual borrower or household level, 
second, the leaders of GMs and cooperatives, and third, the UNC and the CNCA at 
their different levels of operation. The final section of this paper summarizes 
the major findings and draws the main implications for a re-structuring of the 
Nigerien rural financial system. 
Transaction Coate of Borrowina at the Household Level 
The findings reported in this section are based on a field survey undertaken 
in July-August 1985. The sa•ple included some 900 households throughout the 
different regions of Niger. There were two predominant types of loans in the 
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sample of 482 borrowers fro• institutions4: equipment loans with an average 
amount close to 132 thousand francs CFA, and seed loans averaging only about 1 
thousand francs CFA5 . The results discussed below refer to equipment loans, since 
seed loans consisted priaarily of aid in kind distributed with minimum 
formalities. 
Loan procedures were in general very simple for individual borrowers. There 
were no collateral requirements in any type of loan, but equipment loans would 
typically require a contribution or downpayment by the beneficiary. The loan was 
usually proposed or suggested to the borrower by someone else, rather than a 
result of the borrower's own initiative. 
In a large majority of the cases the equipments and inputs had been received 
on time, and in satisfactory condition. However, an important shortcoming of the 
input delivery process was the lack of knowledge of the correct use of the inputs 
received. Furthermore, only 50 percent of these farmers acknowledged having 
received some training in the use of the equipment and tools received in credit. 
The proportion of borrowers in the sample that recognized being delinquent in 
their payments was almost 37 percent. Among the borrowers of equipment loans, the 
number of delinquent loans represented 53 percent of the observations in that 
group. Insufficient revenues was the reason for non-repayment most frequently 
indicated by the farmers with loans overdue. Another important explanation 
however, was the lack of recovery efforts on the part of the credit institutions. 
4 This sample of institutional borrowers is comprised by all interviews in 
the overall sample of 900 households that had received a loan in the five-year 
period preceding the date of the survey. A detailed description of the sample is 
included in Graham, Cuevas, and Negash (1986). 
5 1 US$ = 330 francs CFA. 
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In summary, the loan procedure can be characterized as a relatively 
expeditious delivery systea of credit in-kind. The aajor shortcomings of the 
system are insufficient training and technical assistance to the credit 
recipients, and poor loan recovery practices. The leaders of cooperatives and GMs 
appear to play an iaportant role throughout the process, according to the 
individual borrowers. However, they seem to concentrate their efforts in the 
disbursement stage, neglecting the repayment function. 
Even though all farmers are in principle aeabers of a GM (hence, of a 
cooperative), the group itself does not perform a clear role in the operation of 
the system. There is no collective responsibility for the loans received, nor 
group pressure to repay or group support to those in arrears. The group appears 
to operate primarily as a meeting place to communicate the availability of credit 
and collect the names of interested villagers. These functions will certainly 
reduce transaction costs of borrowing, but will not improve the efficacy of the 
system as a resource allocation mechanism. 
The measurement of transaction costs of borrowing at the household level 
considers two major components: first, the explicit expenses associated with 
traveling to other places to apply and negotiate the loan, receive the 
disbursements, and repay the loan, and second, the opportunity cost of the time 
spent in performing the activities involved in the different steps of the loan 
procedure. The opportunity cost of time was valued at 514 francs CFA per day6 . 
The transaction costs of borrowing for the individual farmers are reported in 
Table 1. This table summarizes the costs incurred by the different participants 
6 Estimated value added per day per active person, based in the figures of 
rural GDP per capita reported in Cuevas (1986), the proportion of active 
population over total derived from the 1977 census, and an estimated ratio of 
value added to GDP of 0.6. 
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in the credit system. The costs borne by individual farmers are rather low by 
most standards. One percent of the amount of the loan represents less than one-
tenth of the usual interest rates charged on loans (11-13 percent). Studies 
conducted in other developing economies have found transaction costs equivalent 
to at least 30 percent of the explicit interest rate, and as high as twice the 
level of the lending rate. As suggested earlier, these low cost levels are 
reflecting the incipient developaent of the credit system, rather than a highly 
efficient operation. Most of these costs are generated at the disbursement stage, 
a finding that reinforces the impression that the Nigerien credit network 
performs primarily input delivery functions. 
The results presented thus far suggest that individual farmers benefit from 
relatively low transaction costs of borrowing institutional loans. The simplicity 
of the input delivery system and the cost economies involved in operating through 
their group organizations explain these low transaction costs incurred by 
individual borrowers. 
Transaction Costa at the Gii and Cooperative Level 
This section relies upon data obtained in interviews with the leadership of 
24 cooperatives and 73 "groupeaents autualistes" (GMs) carried out in January-
February 1986. According to these interviews, the responsibility of deciding the 
distribution of credit among individuals was shared by the leaders of GMs, of the 
cooperatives, and by the representatives of the UNC. The CNCA, i .. e., the lending 
institution, was perceived as playing a major role in these decisions in only 7 
percent of the cases. Numerous criteria were indicated for allocating credit to 
the individual beneficiaries. The criteria most frequently cited by GM and 
cooperative leaders were the individual's ability to repay, the place in the list 
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of applicants, and the ability to provide a deposit ("caution"). Less than half 
of the leaders interviewed were in possession of records indicating who was 
eligible for a loan among the me•bers of the group. Only 18 percent of them had 
records or documentation indicating the amounts received by each farmer. These 
findings, consistent with the level of literacy documented in the survey, suggest 
that records about eligibility for credit and loan disbursements are kept 
"memorized" by the leaders of the organizations, rather than in written form. 
The distribution of responsibilities in loan recovery were not clear. Most 
cooperative leaders felt that recovery was a role to be performed by the UNC 
official, whereas GM leaders attributed this function to the cooperative leaders. 
Basic information for loan recovery, i.e., debt records, existed in one-half of 
the cases. 
The characteristics of the credit process at the GM and cooperative levels 
outlined above reinforce the notion that this credit network operates primarily 
as an input delivery channel. Input distribution appears to be performed with 
relative efficiency. The system fails in the areas of loan-allocation decisions, 
documentation of debts, and loan recovery. In all these areas responsibilities 
and roles are not clearly assigned, and essential records and documentation are 
absent or deficient. It is not surprising then that the costs of operating the 
system at this level are minimal, as shown in Table 1. 
Overall, the low costs per CFA borrowed are demonstrating the advantages of 
group borrowing, i.e., of handling large (multiple) loans through the common 
leadership of the organization. The low cost per loan however, is indicating the 
lack of sophistication of the loan procedure. Moreover, it is reflecting the 
deficiencies of key loan allocation practices, the poor documentation of 
disbursements, and the limitations of loan recovery procedures. 
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Operational Costa of Lendins at the Institutional Level 
The field survey undertaken in January-February 1986 included interviews with 
14 officials of the "Union Nationale de Cooperatives" (UNC) and 5 branch managers 
of the "Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole" (CNCA). UNC officials devoted less 
than half of their time to credit-related activities, whereas CNCA personnel, as 
expected, was dedicated exclusively to perform their credit functions. This 
differences in the allocation of time were taken into account to compute the 
costs associated with credit activities. 
It is evident from the figures presented in Table 1 that the institutions in 
questjon bear a large proportion of the costs associated with the credit delivery 
system. The CNCA alone shows operational costs per cooperative in the portfolio 
equivalent to 5.44 percent of the average loan amount per cooperative. The UNC 
activity at the arrondissement level also results in rather substantial 
operational costs of lending. 
It must be noted that the costs reported in Table 1 do not include the 
expenses incurred at the central offices of the UNC and the CNCA. This implies 
that those costs still under-estimate the total transaction costs of operating 
the credit delivery system. Given the distribution of personnel of the CNCA 
between the central office (43 percent) and the branches (57 percent), one could 
assume an overhead of about 75 percent attributable to central-office expenses. 
Wjth this assumption, the CNCA costs per CFA lent increase to 9.52 percent, and 
the combined costs of the CNCA and the UNC raise to almost 12 percent of the 
amounts lent. 
Finally, it must be recalled here that the costs measured above for the CNCA 
correspond only to the non-interest costs of loan administration. These do not 
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include the costs of funds (essentially determined by the BCEAO discount rates), 
or the risk premiua or default cost. The latter reflects the effects of default 
risk on total transaction costs of lending of the institution. 
For the CNCA, the risk premium was estimated at 25.6 percent, using 
an estimated default rate of 18 percent of the CNCA portfolio7, the 9.5 percent 
administration costs reported above, and the preferential discount rate of the 
BCEAO as the cost of funds of 8 percent. This still represents a lower-bound 
estimate since no assumption has been made about the default risk involved in the 
loans granted to the government and to public and semi-public enterprises. 
With loan administration costs of 9.5 percent and risk premium of 25.8 
percent, total transaction costs of lending of the CNCA become 35.3 percent of 
the amounts lent. This is certainly a very high costs of lending, by any 
standards. This cost must be contrasted against the 2.5-percent margin allowed by 
the BCEAO for on-lending to the CNCA and other banks. The lending costs of the 
CNCA exceed by about 33 percent this regulated margin, i.e., the CNCA incurs 
losses of 33 percent of the amount of loans granted every year. 
In summary, even though the credit delivery system of Niger does not include a 
complete set of well developed banking practices, the resulting costs of the 
system appear even higher than those recorded in development banks of other low-
income countries. Even without devoting sufficient resources to key activities 
such as loan evaluation and loan recovery, the costs of implementing the delivery 
of inputs to the cooperatives and GMs are significant. The operations of the CNCA 
result in an annual loss equivalent to (at least) 33 percent of the funds lent by 
this institution. The following section will summarize the transaction costs 
7 This default rate does not consider loans to government institutions and 
parastatals. 
11 
involved in the credit system for all participants, and will draw the major 
implications of these findings. 
SU1111ary and Iaplicationa 
The total non-financial costs of operating the system are 9.14 percent of the 
amount of credit channeled from the institutions to the individual borrowers. If 
the estimated central-office costs of the CNCA are included in this estimate, 
total transaction costs per CFA in the credit delivery system increase to 13.22 
percent. The largest share of these costs is borne by the participating 
institutions (86 percent of the total), i.e., the public sector is supporting the 
large majority of the costs of the credit delivery system. Credit beneficiaries 
have access to in-kind loans at low transaction costs, but the costs incurred by 
the institutions involved are significant. 
This paper has shown that the institutional agricultural credit system of 
Niger is for the most part limited to the input delivery (credit disbursement) 
role. Despite the deficiencies of key lending practices the costs of the system 
are substantial. The major implications anticipated earlier in this paper can be 
restated and revised here. First, the system in its current state does not and 
cannot perform a resource allocation role through financial intermediation. 
Secondly, the system does not provide the financial intermediary with instruments 
of credit rationing. A serious effort towards the development of a viable rural 
financial system should be undertaken. 
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Table 1 
Institutional Credit. SUnmaJ:y of Transaction Costs Incurred by 
Different Participants at Different Levels of the Credit Network 
Level I Participant 
Individual bonraer 
Gt! leaders 
UNC, Arrondissenent 
UNC, Department 
SUb-total Gt! level 
Cooperative leaders 
UNC, Arrondissement 
UNC, Department 
CK;A, Department 
SU't>-total cooperative level 
Total 'l'1w H cticn COsta per CIA.a 
SUnmary by participant: 
Individual borrower 
Average Cost 
per Loan 
CFA 
1,120.7 
1,843.2 
2,823.3 
218.4 
4,884.9 
1,969.6 
29,288.7 
2,699.4 
90,238.5 
124,196.2 
Gt! and cooperative leaders 
Institutions 
UNC 
CNCA 
Source: osu SUrveys, 1985 and 1986. 
Average 
Loan An:>unt 
CFA 
131,557.0 
604,583.9 
1,659,960.8 
Cost per 
CFA 
% 
0.85 
0.30 
0.47 
0.04 
0.81 
0.12 
1.76 
0.16 
5.44 
7.48 
0.85 
0.42 
2.43 
5.44 
a Does not include costs of the central office of the cx:A. If these are 
considered the total cost per CFA increases to 13.22 percent. 
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